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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
 
 
 
3 
 
© Cass Business School February 2018 
 
Overview
he financial crisis led to an increase in 
the share of acquisitions involving 
distressed targets. While we don’t 
know when the next crisis will happen one of 
the few things we can be sure of in financial 
markets is that one day there will be another 
one, throwing up distressed acquisition 
opportunities. And even without a full-blown 
crisis, opportunities will arise, whether simply 
from the normal economic cycle or industry 
disruption that leaves a company in crisis 
mode. Hence the need for this report, which 
looks to analyse past distressed acquisitions 
with a motivation to better prepare us for the 
future. 
The logic for the need and indeed attraction 
of such deals is clear. Corporate finance 
scholars have argued that mergers and 
acquisitions can be effective means for 
resolving financial distress, and they can take 
place either inside or outside of bankruptcy. 
Acquisitions of distressed targets are one of 
three routes to reorganize firms in financial 
distress, the other two being corporate 
restructuring in a strict sense and liquidation. 
But the question of whether it is the right thing 
to do for the acquirer is harder to answer. It is 
not hard to find examples providing evidence 
either way. In 2009, immediately post the 
financial crisis, Premier Oil acquired the 
distressed OIlexco North Sea. Initially the 
stock performed well, but now you will find 
Premier shares at less than half the level they 
were at the time of the deal, having also 
underperfomed the sector by c.50%. It could 
be that the deal triggered the 
underperformance but more likely this was a 
case of doubling up on a falling asset, oil. 
The timing of distressed acquisitions is 
covered in this report and we account for 
more general industry trends to try to answer 
the ‘cause’ question suggested by the 
following example. In 2012 the distressed 
retailer JJB Sports was acquired by 
competitor Sports Direct. Five years later, 
despite what has been a very tough time for 
retailers in general (the impact of online 
competitors, Amazon in particular), Sports 
Direct’s share price is still up versus 2012 and 
has marginally outperformed the FTSE 100. 
Without the JJB Sports deal, would it have 
done so? 
So, the questions are there to be answered, 
and here are our answers: 
- We find that distressed acquisitions 
have particular characteristics. They 
tend to take longer to complete, and, 
perhaps counterintuitively, the deals 
involve higher premiums. But they are 
no harder to complete than any ‘normal’ 
transaction. 
 
- Based on our analysis of the short-term 
deal announcement reaction, we also 
find no particular significant reaction, 
positive or negative, associated with 
distressed acquisitions as compared to 
‘healthy’ acquisitions. 
 
- However, if the deals are carried out in a 
‘falling market’ then distressed deals are 
welcomed by the market more than non-
distressed acquisitions. 
 
- And in the longer-term, looking three 
years out, our analysis shows that the 
newly-combined firms where the target 
is distressed generally benefit from an 
overall improvement in operational 
performance compared to their 
combined pre-bid performance 
(compared to a base case ‘healthy’ 
acquisition), evidence of better synergy 
realization or the benefits of 
opportunistically consolidating a market. 
So, if you are looking to make one of these 
deals, be patient, the market’s reaction may 
depend on the timing but the payoff 
operationally may well be positive. 
T 
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Background (and what we knew)
ensen in 19911 argued that mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) are an effective means 
for resolving financial distress, and they 
can take place either inside or outside of 
bankruptcy. As mentioned above, acquisitions 
of distressed targets are one of three routes to 
reorganize firms in financial distress, the other 
two being corporate restructuring in a strict 
sense (asset, operational, financial and 
managerial) and liquidation (piecewise sale).  
Sales of bankrupt targets became more 
frequent in the 2000s, emphasising the 
importance of studying the distressed 
acquisition market. Our research supports the 
analysis as it is found that after a major 
sustained fall in the stock market index such as 
those that happened in 1990, 2000-2003, and 
2007/2008, distressed (using the Interest Cover 
Ratio criteria) and bankrupt acquisitions 
typically increase as a proportion of total M&A 
and tend to stay at a higher than average level 
for up to three to four years (see Figure 1).  
Do the deals make sense? 
Approximately nine years following the financial 
crisis, research on distressed acquisitions is still 
scarce and has relied on the earlier comparison 
between acquisitions in bankruptcy and 
acquisitions outside bankruptcy of healthy 
companies (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 19982), 
or on the study of acquisitions solely of 
distressed companies (Clark and Ofek, 19943), 
or on the comparison between acquisitions and 
bankruptcies as exit strategies (Bergström et 
al., 20054). This paper thus fills the void in the 
literature by exclusively investigating 
acquisitions of distressed companies, including 
those involved in bankruptcy proceedings, over 
a long time period to account for 
macroeconomic effects across multiple M&A 
cycles. 
                                                          
1 Jensen, M.C., Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1991 
2 Hotchkiss, E.S. and Mooradian, R.M., Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 1998 
Value creation 
Hotchkiss and Mooradian study two matching 
sub-groups of acquisitions, those that were 
acquired in Chapter 11 and those that were 
acquired outside Chapter 11. They find 
evidence of value creation for the first group 
(using cash flow performance and event 
studies) but not for the second group. However, 
this is for a very specific class of targets, 
bankruptcies, where the negotiating power of 
the seller is basically nil and likely in the hands 
of the creditors. This paper extends their results 
and, as we will see, shows that newly-combined 
firms where the target is either distressed or 
bankrupt generally benefit more in performance 
over the long-term compared to deals with a 
‘healthy’ target. 
The market reaction 
In terms of short-term performance, even 
though Clark and Ofek argue that 
announcement of abnormal returns for both 
acquirers and distressed targets are similar to 
those for the general population of acquirers 
and targets, Hotchkiss and Mooradian find 
positive abnormal returns for both acquirer and 
bankrupt target. Again, note the specification of 
bankrupt. The results in this report, that 
includes the financial crisis in its analysis, show 
something a bit different than in the 1998 paper, 
with the time of deal mattering for both acquirer 
performance and the performance of the 
combined entity. And while Hotchkiss found 
bankrupt targets lose out in the process in light 
of their more limited bargaining power we find 
different results for the more general class of 
distressed sellers. Or could it be that something 
changed fundamentally in the financial crisis in 
terms of either distressed targets’ bargaining 
power or market cynicism as to the value of 
distressed acquisitions? 
3 Clark, K. and Ofek, E., Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 1994 
4 Bergstrom, C., Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. and Wells, M.T., 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2005 
J 
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There is a well-known high correlation between 
periods of high merger activity and high 
valuations. The pro-cyclicality of M&A is 
probably one of the reasons why the general 
value creation of public deals is questioned. As 
the figure below shows, distressed acquisitions 
have their own cycle, a counter cyclical cycle 
that is another potential reason for the greater 
attractiveness as a strategic option that we find 
in this report. 
Interestingly, while bankruptcy acquisitions are 
typically very fast processes compared to non-
bankrupt acquisitions, particularly in downturns 
(in light of the timing issues inherent to a 
bankruptcy process), our extension to 
distressed targets results in quite a different 
finding in ‘normal’ times.  
 
Figure 1: Distressed acquisitions / Total acquisitions
 
Source: Cass Business School 
(Downward arrows represent ‘falling periods’) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
%  Distressed acqusisitions
%  Distressed acqusisitions
Combined Average
Falling Period Average
Gaining Period Average
 6 
 
© Cass Business School February 2018 
 
Our findings 
n the results tables, as well as showing those 
variables directly applicable to this study 
(distressed targets), we include other drivers 
that arose that may be of interest, although 
we do not investigate them in the same level of 
detail. 
Is it harder to get a distressed deal done? 
In Figure 2 we show the results of a regression 
analysis examining the impact of three different 
variables on three outcomes we were 
interested in: Completion Likelihood, Time to 
Completion and Premium paid. 
The statistically significant conclusions for 
distressed deals are that the deals do take 
longer to complete, and you are likely to need 
to pay a higher premium.  
In addition, there is a small but insignificant 
increase in the likelihood of completion. The 
complexity of distressed deals is often high (risk 
of contingent liabilities, for example) so the 
increase in time to completion is not surprising 
but the finding on premium perhaps is, if you 
believe that distressed sellers have less 
bargaining power. They probably do, but 
consider what’s probably been happening to 
the share price. The market won’t have missed 
the deterioration in leverage metrics and the 
share could well be trading below its going-
concern valuation. The sellers will be aware of 
the potentially higher value of the assets to the 
acquirer and so will want a higher premium, 
which will still likely give a low takeout price in 
comparison to intrinsic value 
As well as the variables shown we control in 
particular for: cross-border, acquisition method 
and creditor rights. 
Will the market like it? 
The next analysis involves a regression of 
share price performance around the 
announcement date, from two days before to 
two days after. The results are shown in Figure 
3. We measure abnormal performance as out 
or underperformance of the market. We are 
trying to find the drivers of such performance 
Note that here it’s not really about positive 
performance it’s about a ‘better’ performance 
than you would otherwise expect, all else being 
equal. 
Looking simply at distressed deals we find little 
evidence for a particular reaction one way or 
another. We see the expected negative 
reaction versus deal size (the bolt-ons are the 
deals that are well received, not the mega 
deals) and positive reaction to cash deals.  
As well as the variables shown we control in 
particular for: cross-border, contested bids and 
deal attitude. 
 
Figure 2: Results of regression analysis on various deal completion variables. Source: Cass Business School 
Variable Completion likelihood Time to Complete Premium paid 
Distressed acquisition Positive (very weak) Positive (strong) Positive (moderate) 
Falling period (see 
below) 
Negative (strong) Positive (very weak) Positive (weak) 
Contested bid Negative (strong) Positive (strong) Positive (very weak) 
 
Figure 3: Short run abnormal performance (-2,2) regression. Source: Cass Business School 
Variable Acquirer performance Combined (Acq. + Target) 
performance 
Distressed target Negative (very weak) Negative (very weak) 
Falling period Negative (strong) Negative (strong) 
Distressed target & falling period Positive (strong) Positive (moderate) 
Deal value Negative (strong) Negative (very weak) 
Cash payment Positive (strong) Positive (moderate) 
I 
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The most interesting results relate to deal 
timing and for this we need some definitions: 
Deal timing 
Is there a right time to make a distressed 
acquisition? 
This research identifies five historic ‘crises’ and 
their corresponding troughs, using the MSCI 
World price index graph: 
 1990: The second to last ‘debt’ crisis, 
which primarily affected the US and 
Western Europe 
 
 1998: The Asian crisis that affected 
most of South-East Asia and which 
followed the Russian crisis in 1997 
 
 2001: The initial dotcom crash together 
with the terrorist attack on the Twin 
Towers in New York in the same year 
 
 2003: The second round of large falls in 
stock market valuations following two 
years of highly volatile market 
conditions 
 
 2008: The financial crisis, originating in 
the US but propagating worldwide, 
largely due to global holdings of 
mortgage backed debt. 
Each crisis was allocated three corresponding 
‘Points-in-Time’ (PiT): ‘Trough,’ which is the 
lowest point and trough of the crisis year, 
‘Previous Peak,’ which is the peak where the 
index reaches its highest value before it starts 
falling to the trough (in the index, the closest 
point before the trough), and ‘Next Peak,’ which 
is the following peak where the index reaches 
its highest value after it recovers from the 
trough (in the index, the closest point after the 
trough). The periods have then been 
consolidated into three major periods with 
similar characteristics, i.e., the stock market 
was behaving similarly in these periods. The 
definitions of the three major periods are as 
follows: 
 Period from beginning of index period 
to Previous Peak – ‘In Between Peaks’  
 
 Period from Previous Peak to Trough – 
‘Falling Market’, from beginning to 
middle of crisis 
 
 Period from Trough to Next Peak – 
‘Gaining Market’, from middle to end of 
crisis. 
Now we can return to the results in Figure 3. We 
find some very interesting results. While the 
market is understandably nervous in general 
about deals being done while the market is 
falling, if you are buying a distressed asset the 
opposite is true, it will welcome (relatively) that 
type of deal. 
Will it improve your business? 
Lastly, we turn to more long-term 
considerations. Again, we carry out a 
regression on the key variables, this time to look 
at their impact on operating metrics. The results 
are shown in Figure 4 below. Reassuringly in 
terms of the quality of our data and process we 
see results consistent with previous studies on 
variables such as deal value (larger deals often 
destroying value) and cross-border M&A (also 
viewed correctly as higher risk). For the variable 
we are really interested in, ‘distressed’, the 
results are unambiguous, distressed 
acquisitions are more likely to be positive in 
terms of change in ‘cashflow’ (EBITA / Sales), 
return on equity and operating performance 
(EBITDA / Total Assets). 
As well as the variables shown in the table we 
control in particular for industry relatedness. 
  
Figure 4: Results of regressions on changes in performance metric from Y-1 to Y+3 
Variable Cashflow ROE Operating performance 
Distressed acquisition Positive (strong) Positive (moderate) Positive (strong) 
Cross-border acquisition Negative (moderate) Negative (very weak) Negative (very weak) 
Deal value Negative (very weak) Positive (very weak) Negative (very weak) 
Source: Cass Business School
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Conclusions and recommendations 
his report analyses acquisitions of 
healthy, distressed, and bankrupt firms. 
In general, there is no real evidence that 
the market expects acquisitions of distressed 
targets to be any more value enhancing or 
destructive for the acquirer than any ‘normal’ 
deal. However long-term performance actually 
tends to be superior for these deals than the 
norm, so the market is actually being over 
sceptical.  
However, there is a time when the market 
welcomes distressed deals to a greater extent 
than a non-distressed deal. That is at a time of 
falling markets, perhaps when there are 
multiple distressed targets out there, so the 
buyer has the choice of attractive deals. And 
maybe it’s a time when the market is expecting 
such opportunistic deals and so is less fearful 
when the buyer takes the plunge. The market 
generally responds badly to M&A in such times, 
quite understandably, thinking that this is not 
the time to be spending aggressively but it is a 
time to be acting opportunistically. The dislike 
of deals in general in these periods is mirrored 
by a dislike of large deals for an acquirer at any 
time (matching findings in our previous work on 
the attractions of smaller deals). Those bolt-on 
acquisitions are generally well received, and, if 
timed opportunistically, even more so. 
We would also highlight the contrast between 
the operational improvements seen in 
distressed acquisitions compared to the 
deterioration seen after cross-border deals. 
Both types of deal would usually be viewed as 
‘high risk’ but their operating outcomes are 
quite different. Viewing the results from an 
economic point of view, there is evidence that 
newly-combined firms where the target is either 
distressed or bankrupt generally benefit from a 
greater overall improvement in performance 
over the long-term compared to their combined 
pre-bid performance, in line with synergy 
realisation. 
However, the market is not naïve. To do these 
attractive deals could well involve a higher 
premium and take longer, but the chance of 
successful completion is no less than in a 
‘healthy’ deal, unlike if a deal becomes 
contested or hostile.  
Recommendations  
(Things to bear in mind if you are considering 
making an opportunistic acquisition of a 
distressed company) 
 Be patient, but not greedy. The deal 
may take longer to complete. The 
target companies aren’t naïve, they 
know that their share price is probably 
trading below intrinsic value and so will 
want a higher premium than otherwise. 
But you’re still probably getting a ‘good 
deal’. 
 
 Don’t hold back because the market is 
dropping. If you have the capital, then 
the market will understand that this is a 
good time to deploy it. And even in a 
normal market they won’t be 
particularly fearful of a distressed deal. 
 
 Just because the company is 
distressed doesn’t mean the asset 
doesn’t have value. Whether through 
operational turnaround or simply the 
elimination of a competitor, your 
company will generally benefit more 
from these deals than if you bought a 
supposedly healthy target. 
 
 
T 
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Our approach 
s this study focuses on the comparison 
of distressed / bankrupt targets versus 
healthy targets, it is important to find a 
robust classification for ‘distressed’ firms. 
Despite the vast number of measures of 
distress there is some consensus over the use 
of the Interest Cover Ratio (ICR), expressed as 
Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, 
and Amortisation (EBITDA) divided by the Net 
Interest Expense, measured in the year prior to 
the acquisition. This measure has been 
favoured by academics and practitioners alike 
because it captures firms suffering from both 
economic and financial distress, incorporating 
operating performance and financial expenses 
at the same time (see, for example, Rajan and 
Zingales6). From the total M&A population of 
265,574 deals in the time period under analysis 
(1984-2015), the interest coverage ratio was 
only available for 24,105 targets (9% of the 
initial sample). Please refer to the Appendix for 
the time-series of the data and criteria used in 
this paper. That table also shows other 
restrictions for parts of the study, that include 
accounting data for the study of financial 
performance and market value data for the 
event study. 
In summary: 
1. In the first step, as stated above, we require 
the ICR be available (both EBITDA and interest 
expense are available), leaving us with 24,105 
deals.  
2. Exclude the financial services industry, 
yielding 20,984 deals. (This is unfortunate given 
the size of the industry and its centrality to the 
last market downturn but the different nature of 
operational metrics, combined with the 
regulatory imposed nature of ‘distress’, makes 
it unavoidable. This is also the case for 
comparable academic studies). 
3. Insist on certain acquirer information being 
available, yielding the final number of 10,930 
deals. (There is an additional screening for data 
                                                          
6 Rajan, R. and Zingales, L., Journal of Finance, 1995 
required for the event study such as the market 
value of target). 
In this paper a target is classified as ‘Distressed’ 
if the firm has an ICR less than one in the year 
prior to the transaction and at the same time it 
is in the first quartile of the industry ICR in the 
same year (necessary due to industries having 
very different leverage ‘norms’). If the target 
does not fulfil these two requirements, then it is 
viewed as ‘healthy.’ So, we have: 
Deals involving healthy targets – 9,043 (82.7%) 
Deals involving distressed targets – 1,887 
(17.3%) 
Our questions 
We look to tackle the following four main 
questions: 
 Are acquisitions of distressed 
companies harder to get done? (In 
terms of likelihood to complete, time to 
completion and premium paid) 
 
 Will the market respond more positively 
to a distressed acquisition than to an 
acquisition in general? 
 
 Is there a ‘right time’ to make a 
distressed acquisition? 
 
 Will an acquisition of a distressed 
company improve your own 
performance in the longer-term? 
Our techniques 
We tackle these questions using three 
techniques. 
Event study 
Our event study measures the market reaction 
to the announcement of a deal. For those 
believers in efficient markets, this is also taken 
A 
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as a marker as to the value creation (or not) of 
the deal. While this data is often cited and is the 
most widely used to judge deal success, there 
are issues with that viewpoint such as its 
interaction with risk arbitrage strategies. In this 
study we use a window that runs from two days 
prior to announcement to two days after to 
catch any pre-announcement run up and to 
allow the market to digest the financial 
implications of a deal. The abnormal returns are 
calculated versus those of the overall market. 
Ratio analysis 
In order to examine the long-term performance 
of acquirers, a selection of accounting ratios are 
used. The aim is to investigate the development 
of operational performance post-acquisition for 
the combined entity compared to pre-
acquisition for the ‘combined’ firms (financial 
data for acquirer and target added together). 
The indicators utilised are ‘Cash Flow’ (EBITDA 
/ Sales), Return on Equity (Net Income / Total 
Equity) and Operating performance (EBITDA / 
Total Assets). 
Regression analysis 
We use regression analysis to look at the 
drivers of outcomes such as completion, time to 
completion, stock performance (in conjunction 
with the event study technique) and operating 
performance, specifically looking for distressed 
targets as a potential driver. We use regression 
analysis rather than a simple event study to 
eliminate potential cause and effect issues. For 
example, simple analysis could show that 
distressed acquisitions are welcomed by the 
market when actually it is the fact that a 
distressed deal is less likely to be cross-border 
(deals that are generally not welcomed by the 
market) that is driving the outperformance. 
In all the analysis above, two of the factors that 
we have controlled for are particularly 
significant. The first is the industry that the 
company is in. Clearly when we look at share 
price performance or accounting metrics certain 
industries will have periods when these will 
have tended to rise or fall, independent of the 
deals we are looking at. This is adjusted for. 
Secondly there is a size issue. We do not want 
a stock move or profitability improvement to be 
ascribed to a very small deal. We control for this 
as well. 
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Appendix
The main sources for the data used in this paper are Thomson ONE Banker and Thomson Datastream. 
In the spirit of Faccio et al.7 this paper defines a merger or acquisition as one where there is an 
acquisition of majority interests, i.e., only deals where the acquirer owned less than 50% of shares in 
the target pre-acquisition and more than 50% of shares in the target post-acquisition have been 
included. The sample excludes Leveraged Buyouts, Spinoffs, Recapitalizations, Self-Tenders, 
Exchange Offers, Repurchases, and Privatisations. The sample also excludes financial institutions 
(banks, savings banks, unit trusts, mutual funds, and pension funds) in light of their special regulatory 
environment and accounting issues, in line with, e.g., Martynova and Renneboog8. The data spans the 
period between 1 January 1984 and 31 December 2008 and the initial sample includes 265,574 deals, 
the total number of M&A deals in the time period identified by the database, public and private, following 
our criteria. Target and deal information were downloaded from Thomson ONE Banker. Acquirer and 
industry financial information were downloaded from Thomson Datastream.  
Figure 5: Condition requirements by year for study. Source: Cass Business School 
Year 
 
Number of Deals 
Number of Deals 
passing the ICR 
screen for targets 
Number of deals 
after dropping 
financial industry 
Number of deals 
passing acquirer 
information screen 
 
Number of deals 
passing Event study 
screen for both 
targets and 
acquirers 
1984 2,055 38 32 10 4 
1985 847 76 71 37 24 
1986 1,126 166 155 83 47 
1987 1,300 179 172 96 53 
1988 1,943 319 297 142 80 
1989 2,719 355 343 126 73 
1990 2,535 244 221 100 52 
1991 4,066 278 237 130 76 
1992 4,292 263 226 114 63 
1993 4,860 275 234 99 52 
1994 5,446 284 235 133 93 
1995 7,035 424 357 208 134 
1996 7,185 457 410 249 162 
1997 7,149 628 550 358 242 
1998 7,873 921 802 547 384 
1999 9,579 1,253 1,083 707 528 
2000 11,038 1,203 1,048 670 486 
2001 9,072 975 832 497 362 
2002 7,629 882 757 386 284 
2003 8,736 1,027 889 443 300 
2004 9,819 900 746 434 338 
2005 10,954 1,113 959 535 404 
2006 12,562 1,295 1,102 590 479 
2007 14,547 1,496 1,279 680 491 
2008 14,657 1,387 1,192 573 430 
2009 13,968 1,379 1,240 552 437 
2010 14,955 1,231 1,072 509 402 
2011 14,460 1,138 1,002 434 339 
2012 12,759 1,035 905 392 314 
2013 12,245 861 750 307 244 
2014 13,747 1,000 877 371 310 
2015 14,416 1,023 909 418 341 
Total 265,574 24,105 20,984 10,930 8,028 
                                                          
7 Faccio, M. McConnell, J.J. and Stolin, D., Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2006 
8 Martynova, M. and Renneboog, L., Advances in Corporate Finance and Asset Pricing, 2006 
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